Term paper on the US selling arms to Taiwan

 

INTRO

 

A recent issue in the news is the United States selling arms to Taiwan. These arms would be used for Taiwan to defend itself against an attack by China, a nation that Taiwan is technically a part of, and which China wants to have reunited with it.

 

This paper will look at the history of the tensions between China and Taiwan since 1949. It will then make an overview of Realist theory, which will then be used to analyze the situation and to predict future occurrences in this situation. The prediction is that the situation will continue in its current form, that neither side will take a drastic step in the struggle, because of the consequences involved being too great.

 

HISTORY

 

Before, during, and immediately after World War II, the Kuomintang (KMT) was the “ruling party” in China, at that time under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. The quotes are there because the KMT’s rule of China was never total. The KMT was the government that accepted the Japanese surrender in 1945 though, and it enjoyed support from the United States, the Soviet Union, and others. But even with support like that, the KMT was soundly defeated in the ensuing civil war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[1]

 

As defeat loomed, Taiwan became the place for the KMT to bolt to. Many people from the mainland had moved to Taiwan, and the KMT had pretty much taken over the government and tightened its grip on the island.[2] As more cities in mainland China fell to the CCP, the KMT moved first its headquarters to Taipei (August 1948), then its treasures, then its capital (December 8, 1949).[3]

 

Meanwhile, Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949 at the gate of the Forbidden City, in Peking.[4]

 

Taiwan and the KMT had been largely abandoned by both the United States and the Soviet Union up until the onset of the Korean War in 1950. The Soviet Union began to back the CCP after it became obvious that they were going to win, and the US got annoyed with the KMT’s inability to win the civil war even with all the help they had received.[5] But with the onset of the Korean War, the perception of a communist threat in Asia became prominent, and the US supporting South Korea made it hard to not support another Asian nation that had been an old American ally and was likely to be overrun by the Communists.[6]

 

The US backing Taiwan did not sit well in Peking, and they wanted to use the Cairo Declaration (that Taiwan would be part of KMT-ruled China[7]) to get Taiwan because they felt the US wanted to use Taiwan as a springboard for future action against China; this has been a central part of the CCP’s creed ever since.[8]

 

Since then, China and Taiwan have been in basically hostile states of limbo, with China claiming Taiwan as another Chinese province and Taiwan generally wanting to not be ruled under China’s Communist government, and lately, wanting independence.[9]

 

Recently, Taiwan entered into an agreement with the US to buy some ships, submarines and military aircraft.[10] Taiwan feels that it needs the arms to defend itself from China, who has set up 50 additional missiles per year along the Taiwan Strait, and that the US selling arms is a commitment to defense from a Chinese attack.[11] China considers Taiwan to be Chinese territory, and feels the missile buildup is necessary to keep Taiwan from declaring independence.[12]

 

GOALS

 

The three main actors in this issue are China, Taiwan, and the United States. Each individual actor has its own set of goals in this dispute. As stated above, the goal of China is reunification with Taiwan. The interest of Taiwan is to be free of Communist Chinese rule. The goal of the US is multifaceted: to keep good relations with an old ally with economic benefits for the US, and to normalize relations with China, which had emerged as a major power.[13]

 

THEORY

 

The theory that best fits and will be used to analyze the situation between China and Taiwan, which involves the US as well, will be Realism.

 

The key points of realism are as follows[14]:

 

APPLYING THE THEORY TO THE ISSUE

 

A quick look will show that Realism is in fact the proper theory. The first point Realism makes is that the key actors are states, and in this situation the key actors mentioned above are all states; there aren’t any individuals or non-governmental organizations involved directly.

 

The theory also states that the state seeks power, is a unitary actor and has a national interest. China seeks power, by wanting to control Taiwan, which it doesn’t now. China is also a unitary actor, there hasn’t been any opposition from within China’s borders unless you count Taiwan as such. Thirdly, China has a national interest of controlling Taiwan.

 

Taiwan seeks power as well, by being able to make its own decisions and rule itself, without being subordinate to China. It hasn’t always been as unitary of an actor though, and its stance has changed over the years towards what exactly it wants. The old government, under the KMT, also wanted a “one China” policy, but with the KMT ruling China and not the CCP.[15] The new government which has gained power takes more of a pro-independence approach, and in fact, former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui said Taiwan and China has a “state-to-state” relationship (which angered China).[16] Its national interest is in line with its seeking of power, although it doesn’t wish to govern itself and another country too in the way China does.

 

As the United States goes, the only part of the theory that deeply applies is the part about national interest. The US has a national interest for each nation. Trade is huge. For example, the arms sales to Taiwan could mean years of increased jobs at the plant that builds the planes Taiwan will be buying, among other jobs created.[17] China is also a large trade partner with the US. Therefore, the US has a national economic interest that both Taiwan and China continue to exist.

 

CONCLUSION

 

Realism assumes actors are rational. They will weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the consequences, good and bad, of the actions which they choose to take in their struggle for power.[18]

 

As such, the Realism theory predicts that the standoff will continue basically as-is. China would consider the fact that Taiwan has the backing of the US should an attack occur, and decide not to risk the wrath of the US. In addition, China’s military technology is wanting.[19] Taiwan will consider that China is a formidable enemy, if for no other reason than sheer numbers, and that the US has only pledged its support for defense, not for offense, and therefore Taiwan will not launch an attack against mainland China. Also, the US would want it to stay that way. Letting Taiwan slip to China would deeply impact trade with Taiwan, as well as increase the amount of power and the amount of industrial resources China has. If the US backs Taiwan in an offensive strike, or in provoking Beijing by declaring independence, it could also have some negative results for the US. In any case, Beijing would be very angry at the US. Also, there is the potential that Taiwan would be soundly defeated and would be annexed into China. That would mean the worst of both worlds for the US; Taiwan would be gone, impacting trade and giving China more power, and Beijing would be mad and would likely impose some type of sanctions.

 

The theory also predicts that no side will back down, because each would be sacrificing its national interest.

 

I agree with the prediction the theory makes. I don’t see China backing down from its position anytime soon, especially with its desire to be a superpower just like the US. In addition, the feeling that Taiwan belongs to it is fairly deeply rooted now. I also don’t see Taiwan backing down, because that would be surrendering to China and having to submit to the Communist rule that it has tried to avoid for the last 50 years. The US won’t pull out of this, because Taiwan is too dependent on the might of the US to be able to stand up to China alone, and that means Taiwan and the trade that goes with it goes out the window.

 

I also do not see the two countries directly involved (the US is involved, but in support of one nation while trying to keep things civil with the other nation, it’s not trying to conquer or trying to avoid being conquered) launching an attack. As stated above, Taiwan only has US support for defense, not offense. Also, China won’t launch an attack for the reason stated above, that the might of the US is too great, and with a president in the White House that is taking a hard line on China, the US is more likely to step in and do something about it. The Chinese might engage in some saber-rattling (like the testing of missiles 130km east of Taiwan in 1996), but it won’t actually do any more than flex its muscles to intimidate Taiwan. The US is also not likely to launch an attack, because it has no reason to and it’s promised only to use force if Taiwan is acted upon.

 

So, in closing, the theory predicts (and I agree) that the situation will stay as it is for a long while, that no actor will back down but no actor will launch a military offensive.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

“China Protests US Arms Offer to Taiwan.” Los Angeles Times, 25 April 2001, pt. A, pt. 1, p. 4.

 

“Foes Remain of Two Minds on ‘One China.’” New York Times, 28 April 2001, sec. A, p. 8.

 

Lee, Lai To. The Reunification of China: PRC-Taiwan Relations in Flux. New York: Praeger Publications, 1991.

 

Long, Simon. Taiwan: China’s Last Frontier. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.

 

Mingst, Karen A. Essentials of International Relations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999.

 

“Quietly, Asia Lauds US Stance on China—Asia Praises US On China.” Boston Globe, 5 May 2001, sec. National/Foreign, p. A1.

 

“Taiwan Proposal Could Benefit Lockheed Plant; Years Of Work Possible From P-3 Orion's Revival.” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 1 May 2001, sec. Business, p. 1E.

 

van Kemenade, Willem. China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1997.



[1] Simon Long, Taiwan: China’s Last Frontier (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991) pp. 33-34.

[2] Ibid., p. 54.

[3] Ibid., p. 59.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., pp. 110-114.

[6] Ibid., p. 115.

[7] Ibid., p. 110.

[8] Ibid., pp. 116-117.

[9] “Foes Remain of Two Minds on ‘One China,’” New York Times, 28 April 2001, sec. A, p. 8.

[10] “China Protests US Arms Offer to Taiwan,” Los Angeles Times, 25 April 2001, pt. A, pt. 1, p. 4.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Lai To Lee, The Reunification of China: PRC-Taiwan Relations in Flux (New York: Praeger Publications, 1991) p. 60.

[14] Karen A. Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999) pp. 70-79.

[15] Lee, p. 36.

[16] “Foes remain…”

[17] “Taiwan Proposal Could Benefit Lockheed Plant; Years Of Work Possible From P-3 Orion's Revival,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 1 May 2001, sec. Business, p. 1E.

[18] Mingst, p. 71.

[19]   Willem van Kemenade, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1997) pp. 127-128.