| FEDERALIST No. 1 | General Introduction
HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 2 | Concerning Dangers
from Foreign Force and Influence JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 3 | Concerning Dangers
From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 4 | Concerning Dangers
From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 5 | Concerning Dangers
From Foreign Force and Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 6 | Concerning Dangers
from Dissensions Between the States HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 7 | Concerning Dangers
from Dissensions Between the States (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 8 | The Consequences
of Hostilities Between the States HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 9 | The Union as a Safeguard
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 10 | The Union as a Safeguard
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con't) MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 11 | The Utility of the
Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy HAMILTON
|
| FEDERALIST No. 12 | The Utility of the
Union In Respect to Revenue HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 13 | Advantage of the
Union in Respect to Economy in Government HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 14 | Objections to the
Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered MADISON
|
| FEDERALIST No. 23 | The Necessity of
a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation
of the Union HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 24 | The Powers Necessary
to the Common Defense Further Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 25 | The Powers Necessary
to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 26 | The Idea of Restraining
the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 27 | The Idea of Restraining
the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
(con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 28 | The Idea of Restraining
the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
(con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 29 | Concerning the Militia
HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 30 | Concerning the General
Power of Taxation HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 31 | Concerning the General
Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 32 | Concerning the General
Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 33 | Concerning the General
Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 34 | Concerning the General
Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 35 | Concerning the General
Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 36 | Concerning the General
Power of Taxation (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 37 | Concerning the Difficulties
of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government MADISON
|
| FEDERALIST No. 38 | The Same Subject
Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan
Exposed MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 39 | The Conformity of
the Plan to Republican Principles MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 40 | The Powers of the
Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained MADISON
|
| FEDERALIST No. 41 | General View of
the Powers Conferred by The Constitution MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 42 | The Powers Conferred
by the Constitution Further Considered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 43 | The Powers Conferred
by the Constitution Further Considered (con't) MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 44 | Restrictions on
the Authority of the Several States MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 45 | The Alleged Danger
From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 46 | The Influence of
the State and Federal Governments Compared MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 47 | The Particular Structure
of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its
Different Parts MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 48 | These Departments
Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control
Over Each Other MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 49 | Method of Guarding
Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government
by Appealing to the People Through a Convention HAMILTON OR MADISON
|
| FEDERALIST No. 50 | Periodical Appeals
to the People Considered HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 51 | The Structure of
the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between
the Different Departments HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 52 | The House of Representatives
HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 53 | The House of Representatives
(con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 54 | The Apportionment
of Members Among the States HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 55 | The Total Number
of the House of Representatives HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 56 | The Total Number
of the House of Representatives (con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 57 | The Alleged Tendency
of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many
Considered in Connection with Representation HAMILTON OR MADISON
|
| FEDERALIST No. 58 | Objection That The
Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population
Demands Considered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 59 | Concerning the Power
of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 60 | Concerning the Power
of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) HAMILTON
|
| FEDERALIST No. 61 | Concerning the Power
of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) HAMILTON
|
| FEDERALIST No. 62 | The Senate HAMILTON
OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 63 | The Senate (con't)
HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 64 | The Powers of the
Senate JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 65 | The Powers of the
Senate (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 66 | Objections to the
Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further
Considered HAMILTON |